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Gerald M. Meier
The widespread practice of national economic planning in developing
countries is moving the problems of international private investment
into a new context. To appreciate more fully the legal-economic issues
that are emerging in this context, we need an analytical framework
for appraising the investment laws and regulatory measures that might
be adopted by an underdeveloped country to attain the double policy
objective of encouraging a greater inflow of private foreign capital
while, at the same time, obtaining from this capital a more effective
contribution to the country's development program. The following
discussion attempts to provide such a framework. In so doing, it bears
directly on the lawyer's role as negotiator and counsellor on matters
of foreign investment; in a broader sense, the analysis touches upon
some formative principles and institutions of international economic
law.
Our concern throughout is with "direct" private investment and
with the national regulation of such investment by underdeveloped
capital-recipient countries.1 Our exclusive concern with policies taken
by the capital-receiving nations is designed to redress the imbalance
in previous studies which have either looked forward to the creation
of a foreign investment code in the form of a multilateral treaty,2 or
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1 The exercise of managerial control distinguishes "direct" investment from "port-
folio" or "indirect" investment. The United States Department of Commerce defines
direct foreign investments to include all those foreign business enterprises in which a
United States resident person, organization, or affiliated group owns a twenty-five per cent
interest, either in the voting stock of a foreign corporation or an equivalent ownership
in an unincorporated foreign enterprise.
The justification for considering only direct investment is that portfolio investment
is of negligible quantitative significance for newly-developing countries and can be
expected to remain so.
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have concentrated on measures adopted by the capital-exporting coun-
tries to encourage and protect foreign investment.3 The experience of
the past two decades has made it increasingly evident that policies
of the capital-recipient countries are more decisive in determining the
quantity and quality of the private capital inflow than are the mea-
sures of the capital-exporting countries; for the host country has con-
trolling power as the ultimate policymaker and can neutralize action
taken initially by the investing country.4 Controls exercised by the host
as O.E.C.D.], DRtAFT CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1962); The
Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital: Further Report by the Secretary-
General, U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. REc. 32d Sess., at 31-42 (E/3492) (1961); Fatouros,
An International Code To Protect Private Foreign Investment-Proposals and Perspec-
tives, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 77 (1961); Gardner, International Measures for the Promotion
and Protection of Foreign Investment, 9 J. PUB. L. 176 (1960); Larson, Recipients' Rights
Under an International Investment Code, 9 J. PUB. L. 172 (1960); Lauterpacht, The Draft-
ing of Treaties for the Protection of Investment, INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 18 (1962); Metzger,
Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign Investment, 9 J. PUB. L.
133 (1960); Miller, Protection of Private Foreign Investment by Multilateral Convention,
53 Am. J. INT'L L. 371 (1959); Schwarzenberger, The Abs/Shawcross Draft Convention
on Investments Abroad: A Critical Commentary, 9 J. PUB. L. 147 (1960); Snyder, Foreign
Investment Protection: A Reasoned Approach, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (1963).
The major proposals for a multilateral investment protection convention have been
those of the British Parliamentary Group for World Government, the Council of Europe,
the International Chamber of Commerce, the O.E.C.D., and the Abs/Shawcross Draft
Convention on Investments Abroad. See B~rrIsi PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR WORLD Gov-
ERNMENT, A WORLD INVESTMENT CONVENTION? (1959); COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN CONSULTATIVE
ASSEMBLY, POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING AN INTERNATIONAL CODE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Doc. No. As/JUR (12)) (1960); INTER-
NATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ATrRACTING FOREIGN INVESrMENT 9-12 (1960); O.E.C.D.,
supra; Draft Convention on Investments Abroad, 9 J. PUB. L. 116 (1960).
We cannot, however, be optimistic that any of the projected multilateral investment
protection conventions will be effectively implemented. The possibility of securing agree-
ment on a strong multilateral convention remains only a distant aspiration, given the
divergent positions of investing and investee countries on the identity and content of
"recognized" principles relative to the protection of foreign investment and the rights
of host countries. To secure agreement among many states, covering widely varied types
of investment, a multilateral convention would have to be drafted in excessively general
terms. Moreover, newly developing countries are unlikely to accede to such a convention
without escape clauses, such as a reservation of the right to expropriate in situations of
"national emergency" or when demanded by the "public interest."
3 In an attempt to promote a larger flow of private capital to developing nations,
several capital-exporting countries have adopted a range of measures that include tax
incentives, state guarantees, and financial assistance to private investors. For a sampling
of the extensive literature on these measures, see, e.g., BARLOW & WENDER, UNITED STATES
TAX INCENTIVES TO DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT (1954); FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARAN-
TEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS, 101-19 (1962); OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (1961); WHrr-
MAN, GOVERNMENT RIsK-SHARING IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1965); Clubb & Vance, Incentives
to Private US. Investment Abroad Under the Foreign Assistance Program, 72 YALE L.J. 475,
487-502 (1963).
4 American businessmen have consistently belieyed that the role of the United States
Government in impeding or promoting profitable private foreign investment is minor
Problems of Foreign Investment
country over the conditions of entry of foreign capital, regulations of
the operation of foreign capital, and restrictions on the remittance
of profits and repatriation of capital are of crucial importance in deter-
mining the flow and contribution of external capital.5
This close relation to public policy is a distinguishing factor in
contrasting the problems of foreign investment in a less developed
country with those in an advanced industrial country. To the potential
investor in an industrially developed country the problems are essen-
tially those of a long-term international business transaction, not pre-
senting new or peculiar problems to the lawyer.6 The legal adviser to
an investor in an underdeveloped country, however, faces very different
policy and legal considerations. He will first have to ascertain what the
legal or policy conditions for foreign investment are in the country con-
cerned. There may be investment statutes or investment policy state-
ments. And the investment adviser will be almost invariably led into
the broader question of development planning in the country of invest-
ment. It is only in the framework of a development plan, with the
complementary question of the allocation of resources, that an invest-
ment may have to be considered and proved acceptable. When it comes
to investment in an underdeveloped country, the lawyer advising an
enterprise is necessarily engaged in questions of public policy and
transactions with the host government-all of which go beyond the
usual technical legal questions to a wider range of considerations of
a political, administrative, and economic character.
By shifting the emphasis to the policies connected with develop-
ment planning in the recipient countries, our discussion focuses more
directly on the primary determinants of the flow and contribution of
foreign private capital. We shall begin by sorting out the various
benefits and costs of private foreign investment from the viewpoint
of a national development program (sections I and II). Against this
compared with the role of foreign governments and with market and economic forces
outside the control of the investor's government. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE
BOARD, OBsTACLES AND INCENTIVEs TO PRIVATE FOREIGN INVEsTIENT 1962-1964, at 39-42
(1965); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACTORS LIMITING UNITED STATES INVESTMENT ABROAD, pt.
2 (1954).
A noted American tax lawyer, Stanley Surrey, reached a similar conclusion on the
effectiveness of American tax policy in encouraging private investment in underdeveloped
countries. See Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 813 (1956).
5 See Address by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, Common Problems of Industrial and Developing Countries,
50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 634 (1964).
6 Friedmann, Foreword-Foreign Investment Planning and Economic Development,
17 RUTGERs L. REv. 251, 253-56 (1963).
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conceptual background, we may then appraise the economic and legal
effects of policy measures being pursued by developing countries to
encourage an inflow of private capital and to regulate the operation
of the foreign enterprise in conformity with developmental objectives
(sections III and IV).
I. PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Although public foreign capital has been the dominant source of
international financing of development, there is increasing attention
to the contribution that might come from private foreign sources. The
American government, in particular, has continually emphasized the
desirability of an increase in private foreign investment. President
Truman's original Point Four program relied on governmentally fi-
nanced assistance in public health, education, and agriculture, but
for other activities it envisaged an outflow of private capital as a
complement to public technical assistance. Successive foreign economic
assistance bills have all acknowledged the desirability of governmental
encouragement to private foreign investment. The promotion of more
private American investment in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is
a current priority objective of the Office of Development Finance and
Private Enterprise within the Agency for International Development.
Even though only a small amount of private capital, relative to gov-
ernment loans and grants, has gone to poor countries, 7 the belief per-
sists that capital from official sources is only a transitional arrangement
and that foreign economic aid should be gradually replaced by private
funds. To this end, considerable interest is being shown in measures
that might promote foreign investment and allow it to contribute
more effectively to the development of the recipient countries.8 The
relationship between private foreign capital and development plan-
ning has therefore become of prime importance.
In their first surge of enthusiasm for development planning, many
underdeveloped countries attempted to formulate comprehensive na-
7 For data on the magnitude and pattern of private capital flows to the poor countries,
see I.M.F., BALANCE OF PAYMENTS YEARBOOK (annual veds.); U.N.- DEP'T ECON. AND Soc.
AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF PRIVATE CAPITAL (1962); U.S. DEP'T OF COIMERCE, U.S.
BUSINESS INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1960); Pizer & Cutler, Foreign Investments
1964-65, Survey of Current Business, Sept. 1965, pp. 22-32.
8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN FOREIGN AID, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L
DEV., REPORT ON FOREIGN AID THROUGH PRIVATE INITIATIVE (1965). See also the recom-
mendations of earlier special Presidential commissions: COMM'N ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY, REPORT (1954) (Randall Comm'n); PRESIDENT'S MATERIALS POLICY COMI'N, RE-
SOURCES FOR FREEDOM (1952) (Paley Comm'n); GRAY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICIES (1950).
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tional plans which it was thought would permit a rational determina-
tion of priorities and ensure consistency and feasibility in making
decisions about the allocation of resources. 9 With the newly won po-
litical independence came a determination to seek economic inde-
pendence. Development planning appeared to be an attractive alter-
native to what was interpreted as an historical pattern of detrimental
dependence on foreign capital and foreign enterprise. Beyond the
ideology of being free from "foreign domination," it was also possible
to establish a strong case for development planning by criticizing the
market mechanism and the inadequacy of private enterprise for the
challenges of development. Arguments could be readily made that the
market mechanism was either ineffective, unreliable, or irrelevant for
developmental problems.
Most of the early development plans, therefore, concentrated almost
exclusively on the public sector of the economy in determining the
amount and composition of investment and looked only to public
sources of foreign capital as the residual means of financing the devel-
opment program.10 This early approach to development planning
gave slight attention to the private sector of the economy and, a for-
tiori, to private foreign capital: an exclusionary or restrictive attitude
t6ward foreign investment was characteristic of the initial efforts at
development planning in many countries.
From the experience with planning, however, has come a realization
that the comprehensive type of detailed planning is premature for
many underdeveloped countries. The actual accomplishments of devel-
opment planning have failed to fulfill original expectations.11 The
difficulties of planning have only .too often been underestimated, and
the anticipated results from a public investment program and inter-
governmental loans have been overestimated. Although a few of the
less developed countries may have already laid the administrative,
social, and educational groundwork that is essential for implementing
a complex development plan, and although a few governments may
possess the necessary political powers and administrative skills, most of
the poor countries are not yet capable of undertaking the comprehen-
9 For a more extensive examination of the nature, scope, and techniques of develop-
ment planning, see generally MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 415-
567 (1964), and references cited therein.
10 PLANNING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT passim (Hagen ed. 1968); U.N. GROUP OF Ex-
PERTS, REPORT ON PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT passim (1964); The Increasing Role
of the Public Sector, 1960 ECON. SURVEY OF AsIA AND THE FAR EAST 53 (1961); A Decade
of Development Planning and Implementation, Economic Bull. for Asia and the Far East,
Dec. 1961, p. 6.
11 Cf. U.N., WORLD ECONOMIC SURVEY - 1964, at 99-118 (1965).
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sive type of planning that entails numerous governmental decisions of
a direct and specific character. Certain undesirable results of compre-
hensive planning are now recognized: in practice, this type of planning
has accentuated inflationary pressures, reacted on the supply of private
entrepreneurship and hindered the full realization of investment
potentials in the private sector, led to inefficient industrialization with
projects that are handicapped by technical difficulties and excess
capacity, and neglected the strategic importance of agricultural growth
and export promotion. 12
Against this background, there has been in recent years a marked
retrenchment from the earlier enthusiasm for comprehensive cen-
tralized planning. A number of developing countries are now attempt-
ing to place more reliance on decentralized regulation: the emphasis
is shifting to the improvement and guidance of the market mechanism
and the provision of economic incentives. In this lighter type of plan-
ning, government policies are becoming more sensitive to the need
for strengthening the general preconditions of development by pro-
viding social and economic overhead capital, establishing markets by
institutional arrangements, and improving the efficiency of markets.
It is also being realized that many of the policy measures that can
affect individual action are not of the usual monetary or fiscal type,
but rather those involving the legal and institutional framework, such
as land tenure legislation, commercial law, and property rights. With
this diminished concentration on the public sector, there is now greater
potential scope for the private sector.
Similarly, developing countries now recognize that it is necessary
to supplement the limited availability of public capital with capital
from private sources if the chronic problems of scarcity of capital and
shortage of foreign exchange are to be alleviated. Many countries have
also come to appreciate that an inflow of private capital may offer
some unique qualitative advantages over public capital. A persistent
problem has been that the government of a poor country may not have
the immediate capacity to employ additional capital assistance pro-
ductively, in the sense of having the investment cover its costs and
also yield a reasonable increase in income. The country's capital ab-
sorptive capacity is low when it is short of people who are capable of
designing, constructing, and operating projects which use substantial
amounts of capital. No such problem of productive use arises with
private foreign capital; by its very nature, a foreign investment neces-
12 See WATERSTON, DEVELOPMENT PLANNING-LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE passim (1965);
Watson & Dirlan, The Impact of Underdevelopment on Economic Planning, 79 Q.J.
ECON. 167 (1965).
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sarily entails the identification of an economic opportunity, the for-
mulation of a productive project, and its efficient implementation.
Direct foreign investment has the quality of carrying with it an integral
ingredient of technical assistance-managerial and technical knowl-
edge which are in even shorter supply than capital. As an instrument
for transmitting technical and organizational change, the private for-
eign investment has a distinct advantage over foreign public capital.
As a result of the course of development planning, the policies now
taken by the host countries with respect to private foreign investment
reveal a mixed picture of both restrictions and incentives. On the one
side, the foreign investor's freedom of action may be constrained by
a variety of governmental regulations that exclude private foreign
capital from certain sectors of the economy, limit the extent of foreign
participation in ownership or management, specify conditions for
the employment of domestic and foreign labor, limit the amount of
profits, and impose exchange controls on the remission of profits and
the repatriation of capital. And yet, during recent years, a progressive
liberalization of policy toward private foreign investment has occurred,
and a number of investment incentive measures have been recently
adopted or are under consideration. These incentive devices include
assistance in securing information on investment opportunities, estab-
lishment of overhead facilities such as industrial estates, protective
tariffs on imports that compete with local commodities produced by
foreign enterprise, exemptions from import duties on necessary equip-
ment and materials, the granting of exchange guarantees or privileges,
tax concession schemes for the encouragement of desired new invest-
ments, and special legislation for the protection of foreign capital.
If recipient countries have assumed a more positive attitude toward
foreign private investment, so too have foreign investors come to real-
ize that the practice of development planning need not in itself be
inimical to the promotion of a larger inflow of private capital. Develop-
ment planning now involves much more than a public investment
program, and the practice of planning is not to be confused with the
issue of public ownership and control. The essence of development
planning is the formulation and coordination of a set of policies to
achieve explicit objectives. In doing this, a plan may stress the com-
plementary relationship between the public and private sectors and
may include policies designed to induce and assist action in the private
sector. Although a development plan reserves some areas of invest-
ment for the public sector, there is at least, on the other side, a clear
statement of policy regarding areas in which private investment is
desired. A development plan can be of service to the foreign investor
1966]
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when it expressly defines the particular role assigned to the private
sector, indicates more clearly the existence of investment opportuni-
ties, facilitates advance calculation, and reduces the foreign investor's
uncertainties regarding his position vis-h-vis the domestic private and
public industrial sectors.
An American government report, for example, lists several advan-
tages that private enterprise may gain from national planning by
underdeveloped countries:
a) Competent development planning, by emphasizing sta-
tistical information and a quantitative framework for future
targets and goals, creates a more dependable environment for
evaluating business opportunities and risks than now exists
in many less developed countries.
b) Planning may define more exactly and more reliably
the fields of activity in which government and private busi-
ness, respectively, are expected to provide the main leader-
ship and activity.
c) Careful planning facilitates the timely provision of
publicly financed installations, such as roads, irrigation facili-
ties, or power plants, which are important to the growth of
private investment. To the extent that development plan-
ning improves the use of resources for development, the
basic facilities to support a vigorous private sector are pro-
vided more rapidly and effectively.
d) The planning process forces the planners to recognize
the size of the requirements for sustained economic growth,
and the consequent necessity of enlisting the forces of private
enterprise in helping to meet these requirements.13
Although the prevalence of national development plans does not
necessarily limit the scope for private activity and may actually pro-
mote more attractive business opportunities, it does mean that private
investors must share with the government a common interest in accel-
erating development. The tasks of development require both more
effective governmental activity and more international investment.
But the private investor-and his counsel-must be aware of the devel-
opmental objectives and priorities of the host country in order to estab-
lish how the foreign investment fits into the country's development
strategy. No longer is it simply a matter of private investors dismiss-
ing investment prospects with the complaint that a "favorable cli-
mate" does not exist; the meaning of a "favorable climate" calls
13 U.S. PRiESDENT's TASK FORCE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, AN Acr FOR INTER-
NATIONAL 'DEVELOPMENT, SUMMARY PRESENTATION 102-03 (1961).
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for reinterpretation in terms of development planning. Nor need
host countries contend that an inflow of private capital entails nothing
but "foreign domination"; in the context of development planning,
the effects of foreign investment need no longer be analyzed as if the
undesirable features in the history of colonialism must be repeated.
Development planning now allows the government to influence the
performance of private foreign investment, but in doing this, the gov-
ernment should appreciate fully the potential contribution of this in-
vestment, and it should devise policies that will encourage a greater
inflow of private capital and gain the maximum contribution toward
the achievement of the country's development. This calls for more in-
tensive analysis of the consequences of foreign investment and for more
thought and ingenuity in devising new approaches that favor the
mobilization of private foreign capital while ensuring its most effec-
tive "planned performance" in terms of the country's development
program.
II. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
To provide an analytical basis for understanding the rationale and
effects of foreign investment policies in the host countries, we shall
formulate in this section a benefit-cost analysis of private foreign in-
vestment. After establishing the possible advantages and disadvantages
to the country receiving private capital, we may then proceed directly
in the next section to an appraisal of existing policies.
At the outset, the influx of private capital contributes to the recipi-
ent country's development program in two general ways-by helping
to reduce the shortage of domestic savings and by increasing the supply
of foreign exchange. Foreign investment supplements domestic re-
sources, thereby reducing the gap between the low level of available
domestic savings and the higher level of investment requirements. A
program of accelerated development also inevitably stimulates imports,
and if, as is common, export earnings do not grow correspondingly, the
developing country encounters a balance of payments deficit. This def-
icit must be financed by drawing down foreign exchange reserves, ac-
quiring official foreign aid, or receiving private foreign capital. Other-
wise, the developing country confronts a persistent foreign-exchange
bottleneck that places a restraint on the pattern and pace of its devel-
opment program. To the extent that the receipt of private foreign in-
vestment eases the shortage of foreign exchange, it permits a more
rapid expansion in real income and removes the necessity of resorting
to a drive toward self-sufficiency and the deliberate stimulation of
1966]
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import-substitution industries out of deference to foreign exchange
considerations.
Beyond this initial contribution, the essence of the case for encour-
aging foreign investment is that over time, as the investment operates,
the increase in real income resulting from the act of investment is
greater than the resultant increase in the income of the foreign in-
vestor. There is a national economic benefit if the value added to out-
put by the foreign capital is greater than the amount appropriated by
the investor: social returns exceed private investors' returns. 14 As long
as foreign investment raises productivity, and this increase is not
wholly appropriated by the investor, it follows that the greater product
must be shared with others and that there must be some direct benefits
to other income groups. These benefits can accrue to domestic labor in
the form of higher real wages, consumers by way of lower prices, and
the government through expanded revenue. In addition, and of most
importance in many cases, there are likely to be indirect gains through
the realization of external economies.
An increase in total real wages is a major direct benefit from an in-
flow of foreign capital. Not only does the addition of capital raise the
productivity of a given amount of labor, but an inflow of capital may
also allow a larger labor force to be employed. The latter effect is espe-
cially significant for those underdeveloped countries that are heavily
populated and have a surplus supply of labor relative to other factors of
production. The shortage of domestic capital is a bottleneck limiting
the employment of labor in nonagricultural activities, and the only op-
tion for labor is to join the redundant agricultural labor force on the
land. An inflow of foreign capital may make it possible to employ more
labor in activities outside the rural sector. From this standpoint, the in-
ternational flow of capital is an alternative to labor migration from a
poor country: when international outlets for the emigration of labor
are restricted, the substitution of domestic migration of labor out of
the rural sector to an industrial sector becomes the most feasible solu-
tion. The social benefit from the foreign investment in the industrial
sector is then greater than the profits on this investment, for the wages
received by the newly employed exceed their former (low or even sub-
sistence) real wages in the rural sector, and this excess should be added
as a national gain.
Domestic consumers may also benefit from direct foreign investment.
14 For an expanded version of this analysis, see MEI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT 92-99 (1963); STREE N, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, ch. 4 (1961); MacDougall,
The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment From Abroad: A Theoretical Approach,
36 ECON. RECORD 13 (1960).
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When the investment is cost-reducing in a particular industry, consum-
ers of the product may gain through lower product prices. If the in-
vestment is product-improving or product-innovating, consumers ben-
efit from better quality products or new products.
In order that labor and consumers might enjoy part of the benefit
from the higher productivity in foreign enterprises, the overseas with-
drawal by the investors must be less than the increase in output. But
even if the entire increase in productivity accrues as foreign profits,
there will still be a national benefit when the government taxes these
profits or receives royalties from concession agreements. If the capital-
importing country is party to a double taxation agreement with the
investing country, with full credit allowed on foreign taxes, it may
enjoy this fiscal benefit by taxing the earnings of imported capital up
to the rate of taxation in the investing country without impeding the
inflow of capital.
The most significant contribution of foreign investment is likely to
come from external economies-that is, from indirect benefits or favor-
able repercussions elsewhere in the economy outside the direct "in-
ternal" benefits of the investment project.15 The growth of one indus-
try may yield external economies by allowing other industries to share
in the facilities which it brings into existence in the form of such
benefits as improved transportation and marketing services, labor skills,
and organizational change, and by inducing a greater output from
other industries which either supply it with materials or services, or
use its product for further processing.
Besides bringing to the recipient country physical and financial cap-
ital, direct foreign investment also includes nonmonetary transfers of
other resources-technological knowledge, market information, man-
agerial and supervisory personnel, organizational experience, and in-
novations in products and production techniques-all of which are in
short supply. As a carrier of technological and organizational change,
the foreign investment provides "private technical assistance" and
"demonstration effects" that are of benefit elsewhere in the economy.
New techniques accompany the inflow of private capital, and by the
example they set, foreign firms promote the diffusion of technological
advance in the economy. This benefit is particularly important in a
less developed country, for while domestic enterprises might not be
adept in the art of innovating, they may offset this deficiency by imi-
15 The concept of "external economies" is discussed in detail by Arndt, External Econo-
mies in Economic Growth, 31 ECON. RECORD 192 (1955); Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1960); Mishan, Reflections on Recent Developments in the
Concept of External Effects, 31 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Sci. 3 (1965).
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tating the advanced techniques demonstrated by foreign firms. Tech-
nical assistance may also be provided to suppliers and customers of the
foreign enterprise. In addition, foreign investment frequently leads to
the training of labor in new skills, and the knowledge gained by these
workers can be transmitted to other members of the labor force or to
local firms which might later employ the newly trained workers.
Private foreign investment can also stimulate additional domestic
investment in the recipient country. If the foreign capital is used to
develop the country's infrastructure,"8 it may directly facilitate more
investment. Even if the foreign investment is in one industry, it may
still encourage domestic investment by reducing costs to industries it
supplies or creating demand in other industries; profits may then rise
and lead to expansion in these other industries. Since there are so
many specific scarcities in a poor country, it is common for investment
to be of a cost-saving character by breaking bottlenecks in production.
This stimulates expansion by raising profits in all underutilized pro-
ductive capacity and by now allowing the exploitation of economies of
scale that had previously been restricted. When the foreign investment
results in a lower priced product, another industry that uses this prod-
uct benefits from the lower price. This creates profits and induces an
expansion in the second industry.
There is also considerable scope for the initial foreign investment
to create external investment incentives by raising the demand for the
output of other industries. The foreign investment in the first indus-
try can give rise to profits in industries that supply inputs to the first
industry, or that produce complementary products, or that produce
goods bought by the factor owners who now have higher real incomes
as a result of the inflow of foreign capital. A foreign investment that is
product-improving or product-innovating may also have similar effects.
A whole series of domestic investments may thus be linked to the for-
eign investment.
These external effects raise production outside the foreign enter-
prise, but the foreign investor cannot appropriate this additional out-
put. The spillover goes unpriced and constitutes an uncompensated
service. When the foreign investment yields an external economy, the
16 Infrastructure (Social Overhead Capital) is "the foundation underlying a nation's
economy (transportation and communications systems, power facilities, and other public
services) upon which the degree of economic activity (industry, trade, etc.) depends. It
may include such intangible assets as the population's educational level and social atti-
tudes, industrial skills and administrative experience .... The building up of a country's
infrastructure, which generally involves projects with a high initial cost and a very long
payoff period, is frequently carried out by the government or with its aid." McGRAW-
HILL, DIcrIONARY OF MODEMN EcoNoMics 261 (1965).
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social desirability (marginal social net product) of the foreign capital
is therefore greater than its private profitability (marginal private net
product). According to the criterion of national economic benefit, the
case for governmental encouragement of private foreign investment is
then strong.
Against these benefits, however, there are on the other side a num-
ber of costs of foreign investment that are detrimental to the host coun-
try's development plan. These costs may arise from special incentives
and concessions offered by the host country, adverse effects on domestic
saving, and pressure on the country's international balance of pay-
ments.
To attract foreign capital, the government of the host country may
have to provide special facilities, undertake additional public services,
extend financial assistance, or subsidize inputs to the foreign enterprise.
These have a cost in absorbing governmental resources that could be
used elsewhere. Tax concessions may also have to be offered, and these
may have to be extended to domestic investors since the government
may not be able to discriminate, for administrative and political rea-
sons, in favor of only the foreign investor. In encouraging foreign in-
vestment, there is thus a fiscal cost through increased government ex-
penditure or foregone revenue.
Once foreign investment has been attracted, it should lead to a
higher level of real income and hence to an increase in domestic sav-
ing. This effect may be offset, however, by a redistribution of income
away from domestic capital if the foreign investment competes with
home investment and reduces profits in domestic industries. The con-
sequent reduction in home savings would then be another indirect cost
of foreign investment.
The most significant costs of foreign investment tend to be those
associated with problems of balance of payments adjustment. Although
the inflow of foreign investment initially provides foreign exchange,
there may subsequently be pressure on the balance of payments when
the foreign investment is serviced. Unless the capital inflow continues
at an increasing rate, the time will come when the inflow of new capital
is insufficient to cover the return outflow of interest, profits, and divi-
dends on the accumulated investments. When a net outflow of foreign
funds occurs, the host country has to generate a surplus in the current
account of its balance of payments equal to the payments on account
of the remittance of foreign earnings. A reallocation of resources then
becomes necessary in order to expand exports or replace imports. And
to accomplish this, the country may have to experience currency de-
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preciation or endure internal and external controls in the form of in-
creased taxation, a tight monetary policy, import restrictions, or ex-
change controls. The adverse effects of these measures of balance of
payments adjustment are indirect costs of foreign investment, to be
added to the direct costs of the foreign payments.
The direct cost of paying for the investment need not be a matter
of concern as long as the foreign investment is of sufficiently high pro-
ductivity to raise domestic real income to an extent equal to, or greater
than, the return on the investment to the foreign owners. If, however,
the payment gives rise to a balance of payments problem, then the
indirect costs come to the fore. When the country is not currently earn-
ing sufficient foreign exchange to cover the external servicing of the
foreign investment, it will have to endure a loss of international re-
serves or adopt measures to adjust the balance of payments. External
measures such as import quotas, tariffs, and exchange restrictions can
be effective in suppressing the demand for imports, but they do so at
the expense of productivity, efficiency, and real income. Internal mea-
sures of higher taxation and credit tightness involve the costs of re-
duced consumption and investment-results which are contrary to the
very objectives of a development plan. And the alternative of currency
devaluation may cause the country to incur the costs of a deterioration
in its terms of trade, changes in income distribution, inflationary pres-
sure, and shifts in resource allocation. In one form or another, the re-
mittance of foreign earnings may therefore be a costly charge on do-
mestic real income.
We have now classified the major consequences of foreign invest-
ment into those benefits or positive gains that contribute to the devel-
oping country's objective of increasing real income and those costs or
negative effects that involve some sacrifice of the objective. The ra-
tional approach to the economic regulation of foreign investment
would be to ensure that each foreign investment project meets the
criterion of yielding a benefit-cost ratio greater than unity.17
With the foregoing conceptual framework in mind, we may now
evaluate the investment laws and regulatory measures of developing
countries.
11 It would be a misconception to express the criterion as "maximum benefit with
minimum cost"; there is no policy that will meet the criterion of simultaneously maxi-
mizing gain (infinitely large) while minimizing cost (zero). See McKEAN, EFFICINCY IN
GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYsTEMs ANALYSIS, WMrH EMPHASIS ON WATER RESOURCE DEVELOP-
MENT 34-49 (1958).
For a more refined analysis, we should consider the time stream of benefits and the
time stream of costs, and then discount these two streams down to the present value
excess of benefits over costs. The rate of discount to be used depends on when it is most
desired that the benefits should accrue--i.e., "social time preference."
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III. APPRAISAL OF POLICIES TOWARD PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The host country's regulatory measures over foreign investment are
embodied for the most part in investment statutes, tax laws, controls
over foreign trade, and foreign exchange regulations. Although these
measures have generally arisen in an unsystematic and ad hoc fashion
rather than as a closely coordinated set of policies, we can conveniently
analyze their consequences in terms of an "allocation effect," a "distri-
bution effect," and a "balance of payments effect."' 8 Each of these ef-
fects may go in either a positive direction in the sense of realizing the
benefits from foreign investment, or in a negative direction in the
sense of entailing the costs of foreign investment. By considering alter-
native investment policies in terms of these effects, we shall be able to
assess their appropriateness in fulfilling the benefit-cost criterion.
Allocation Effect
The "allocation effect" of investment policies has two aspects: the
inducement of foreign investment to one country rather than to an-
other country and, within the recipient country, the allocation of the
investment to one activity rather than to another. Most of the devel-
oping countries have now consolidated foreign investment legislation
in an investment statute which sets forth both the privileges and obli-
gations of foreign investors and specifies the administrative procedures,
rules, and regulations governing the entry and operation of foreign in-
vestment. 19 The statute attempts to encourage an inflow of foreign
capital through the use of tax exemptions, tariff concessions, relaxation
of exchange controls, some guarantee of nonexpropriation and non-
discrimination, and assurances for the repatriation of earnings or cap-
ital. After the prospective investment is subjected to a screening pro-
cess, an "instrument of approval" is generally issued to the foreign
investor qualifying under the statute: this details the assurances and
guarantees granted by the host state as well as the obligations under-
18 These policies are often classified into those involving control over entry, control
over operation, measures of taking, and measures of exclusion. The classification in the
text is adopted because it provides a more direct approach to a benefit-cost analysis of
these measures.
19 For recent lists of investment laws, see U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 2,
Annex IV; U.N. SECRETARIAT, THE STATUS OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL
WEALTH AND RESOURcES 7-62 (A/AC.97/5/Rev. 2) (U.N. Pub. Sales No. 62, v. 6) (1962).
Texts of investment statutes are also periodically available from the World Trade Infor-
mation Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Indicative of the objectives sought by the legislation, these statutes-some of which
may relate to domestic private capital as well as foreign-are variously called "Industrial
Incentive Law," "Pioneer Industries Law," "Export Industry Encouragement Law," or
"Production Development Law."
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taken by the investor regarding the amount, form, operation, and du-
ration of the investment.
From an economic standpoint, the investment statute is effective in
encouraging foreign investment when its provisions reduce nonbusiness
risks, lower costs, or result in an increase in the net rate of return. To
this end, tax concessions represent the major legislative effort to pro-
mote private investment. The concessions take three principal forms:
relief from income and other taxes to "new and necessary industries,"
partial or complete exemption from duties on the importation of es-
sential equipment and materials, and liberal depreciation allowances
in the calculation of company taxes.
It is commonly believed that these concessions have provided some
incentive to foreign capital. But their use can be overdone. For this
type of legislation imposes costs on the government in the form of some
loss of revenue, new differentials in tax burden distribution, and addi-
tional burdens upon administrative facilities. A central issue is whether
these revenue, equity, and administrative costs outweigh the advan-
tages that the use of the incentives may afford to a developing coun-
try.20 In examining this issue, Heller and Kauffman conclude that for
many countries the tax system is relatively unimportant in inducing
investment in comparison with other factors impeding investment, and
that tax relief seems to be of only secondary importance in creating
conditions conducive to industrial growth, especially when the objec-
tive is to increase the level of new investment instead of merely pro-
moting reinvestment.21 Given the low utility of tax incentives, Heller
and Kauffman submit that for most of the developing countries the
costs of tax concessions outweigh the advantages. A study of industrial
tax exemption in Puerto Rico also concludes that tax exemption:
[m]ay serve as an irrational or purely psychological induce-
ment in the sense that it may be instrumental in encouraging
the initiation of new business, but there may be little rela-
tionship between the effect of the inducement or the need for
the assistance and the amount of subsidy actually received.
. . . There is little evidence to indicate that tax exemption
has been an important incentive leading to the expansion of
existing Puerto Rican firms. 22
It is also contended that many of the new firms that use labor-intensive
methods of production would have come to Puerto Rico even without
tax exemptions.
20 See HELLER & KAUFFMAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN Lass DEVELOPED COUN-
TRIES 57-85 (1963).
21 Id. at 60-66.
22 TAYLOR, INDuSTRIAL TAx EXEMPTION IN PUERTO Rico 143 (1957).
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Tax holidays or reduced rates on taxable income are effective, of
course, only when the investment yields substantial taxable profits.
The assistance provided by tax exemption is, in fact, inverse to need:
"as long as a firm experiences losses and needs assistance, it receives no
income-tax subsidy; while the more successful and independent of aid
it becomes, the more subsidy it obtains." 23 In the case of the Industrial-
Tax Exemption Act of Puerto Rico, it has been observed that "this
process has resulted in a maldistribution of the income-tax subsidy, in
which a few profitable firms have received the major share of the sub-
sidy, while the remaining grantees that have needed assistance have
received little or nothing."24
Moreover, the foreign investor in a newly developing country is less
interested in receiving an exemption after a profit is made than he is
in being sure of a profit in the first instance. Measures that enable a
company to earn a profit are more encouraging than the granting of
exemptions after a profit is made. To raise profit expectations, the
government may have to undertake additional public expenditures,
particularly in providing public utilities, developing industrial sites,
expanding labor training facilities, and furnishing statistical and in-
formation services. Governmental measures that increase labor pro-
ductivity and help to stabilize the labor force are especially helpful in
lowering the otherwise high marginal labor cost for a firm. With the
same effect on the government's budget, these expenditures could be
a more effective inducement for private investment than tax reduction.
They would also reveal more directly the real cost of encouraging for-
eign investment. But governments have preferred the alternative of
foregoing future tax revenue rather than incurring greater present
expenditures.
Finally, it can be contended that a developing country might actu-
ally be offering excessive concessions to foreign capital. When confront-
ing large foreign enterprises and competing among themselves for the
short supply of foreign capital, small countries might well provide
more by way of inducement than is necessary-especially when the
concessions do not affect the total of investment forthcoming, but only
its intercountry allocation. Some types of foreign investment (for in-
stance, those to secure a necessary raw material or mineral) would go
to one developing country or another, regardless of inducements, but
the foreign enterprise may "shop around" and attempt to secure the
most favorable terms from each possible source of supply. Special con-
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of international investment, but they can affect the allocation as be-
tween one recipient country or another. The potentially recipient
countries compete among themselves, and the competing concessions
will largely cancel out-to the benefit of no one country. Competitive
tax subsidies among developing countries, for example, may result in
a process in which few of the advantages but most of the disadvantages
of tax subsidies would remain.25 Negotiating independently, each de-
veloping nation offers greater concessions than it would if all the coun-
tries could act under a collective agreement regarding the maximum
concessions that will be made. In this situation, there is a case for in-
ternational discussion possibly leading to conventions or agreements
that would eliminate the excessive competition.26 It is to the interest
of developing countries as a group that the tax treatment should be as
uniform as possible and that individual countries should not offer
extra concessions except in agreement with the others.
Over-concessions are also made when, in order to avoid discrimina-
tory policies, already existent investments are granted the same conces-
sions that are necessary to encourage new capital. There is also the
danger that the temporary preferential treatment, offered by conces-
sions will attract the quick, speculative type of foreign investment that
makes no long-run contribution to the economy, but simply takes ad-
vantage of the concessions. Even for a desired foreign investment that
initially has a high benefit-cost ratio, concessions may be p-olonged for
too long a time: if the benefits come within a short period of time (as
is likely), then prolongation of the concessions beyond this period is
not justified. The cost of "overencouraging" certain types of foreign
investment can be considerable. The problem therefore is not simply
to consider the relative costs of different incentive devices, but also to
devise sufficiently flexible instruments to allow selectivity in the con-
ferral of concessions. The adoption of a selective investment statute,
however, assumes that a necessarily high level of administrative capa-
bility exists so as to allow the conferring of broad discretionary powers
on administrators who must be able to interpret the purposes of the
law and its relati6nship to the country's development program. 27
If the attraction of foreign investment to the country is one objec-
tive of an investment statute, another is to channel the investment into
fields of high priority within the country. By a denial of concessions
25 Id. at 149.
26 See Kaldor, The Role of Taxation in Economic Development, in PROBLEMS IN Eco-
NomIC DEVELOPMENT 185 (Robinson ed. 1965); Seers, Big Companies and Small Countries,
16 KYKrLos 603-05 (1963).
27 See HELLER & KAUFFMAN, op cit. supra note 20, at 50-56.
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or absolute prohibition, developing countries now commonly screen
foreign capital away from certain sectors of the economy that are re-
served for public enterprise or domestic capital. Governmental grants
of permits, licenses, leases, and concessions are an important means of
controlling the acquisition and the extent of rights of foreigners in a
country's natural resources. A growing body of constitutional and leg-
islative provisions prescribes conditions which may be negotiated with
private persons by the appropriate governmental authority.28 In many
countries authorization or official approval is not granted for foreign
investments in the traditional areas of mining, plantations, and public
utilities, which are now reserved for national capital, either exclusively
or by prescribing a share in ownership-control for nationals. Instead
of supporting a continuation of the historical pattern of foreign in-
vestment, developing countries have shifted their emphasis to the en-
couragement of foreign capital in industries that process agricultural
products, manufacture for export, or produce import substitutes. More
and more the channeling of foreign capital appears predicated on a
desire to stimulate industrialization, exercise sovereignty over natural
resources, avoid the granting of monopoly positions to foreign enter-
prises, and protect domestic competitors.
Beyond the negative controls of outright exclusion, the positive in-
ducements to attract foreign investment into desired channels fall into
three main categories: a) tax exemptions or privileges for "approved in-
vestments," b) a tariff structure that induces "tariff factories" to replace
imports and provides high protection on the final stages of production
while reducing or removing tariffs on imported components, and c) the
use of foreign exchange controls (especially multiple exchange rates and
exchange licensing) in order to subsidize specific exports, favor the im-
portation of necessary materials for approved investments, and allow
larger remittance of earnings on desired investments.
Although their effects may be indirect and not readily apparent,
import restrictions and exchange controls are now extremely impor-
tant in determining the pattern of foreign investment. For the effects
of a differentiated tariff structure and multiple exchange rates are
equivalent to those of a scheme of subsidies and taxes, affecting the
rate of return on foreign investment. When the country imposes pro-
hibitive tariffs, or other import restrictions, against foreign manufac-
turers, the foreign manufacturer may be induced to escape the controls
against his product by establishing a branch plant or subsidiary behind
28 For a discussion of what the legislatures of various countries have done to protect
sovereign rights and national interest in natural resources see U.N. SEcRETARIAT, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 7-20.
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the tariff wall. Although the protection would have little effect in
attracting supply-oriented industries, the inducement may be signifi-
cant for the creation of "tariff factories" in market-oriented industries.
It is particularly effective in encouraging the final stages of manufac-
ture and assembly of parts within the tariff-imposing country when
there is an import duty on finished goods while raw materials or inter-
mediate goods remain untaxed.
,Distribution Effect
Turning to the "distribution effect," we are now interested in how
regulatory measures may affect the contribution of the foreign invest-
ment to local income. This contribution depends on the value of total
output attributable to foreign investment and the proportionate share
of local participation in the value of that output. Tax measures-con-
sisting mainly of taxes on income and profits and export duties-are,
of course, the major policies for reducing the share of the gross do-
mestic product accruing to nonresidents. Under double-taxation agree-
ments, the investee country receives the first share of profits taxation.
To raise the share of local partiGipation, however, additional measures
are now also taken to control the operation of the foreign investment.
In particular, many of the investment statutes require domestic part-
nership with the foreign investors, stipulating that a percentage of the
capital in certain industries should be locally owned. The employment
and training of nationals is also frequently sought by requiring that a
certain percentage of the labor force of foreign-owned enterprises should
be composed of nationals or by designating that a fixed percentage of the
payroll should go to nationals. Minimum wage requirements and social
welfare benefits are also designed to ensure a certain return to domestic
labor from the operation of the foreign enterprise. There may also be
requirements for the local production or purchase of components and
supplies. Finally, there are commonly restrictions on the amount of
profit that can be earned or limitations on the distribution of profits.
All these measures are intended to give domestic factors of produc-
tion a larger share of the total value of the foreign enterprise's output.
This intention, however, may conflict with the primary objective of
attracting foreign investment. If domestic partnership limits the man-
agement and control of the enterprise, labor legislation is onerous, and
allowable profits are not 'sufficiently attractive, then foreign investment
will not be forthcoming, and the concessions previously discussed will
be of no avail. It is difficult to determine the point when measures
aimed at increasing the share of domestic income are more than offset
by a loss in total income resulting from a decline in the inflow of
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foreign capital; however, at some point, policies designed to raise the
benefit-cost ratio may result in no benefit whatsoever as foreign invest-
ment ceases.
Balance of Payments Effect
Especial attention should be given to the third effect of foreign in-
vestment measures-that on the balance of payments-insofar as a
shortage of foreign exchange is a serious obstacle for all developing
countries. If the development program is not to be constrained by a
shortage of foreign exchange, policies must be instituted to ensure that
the deficit is as small as possible and that the remaining irreducible
deficit is accommodated by external financing. It is therefore impor-
tant to analyze how policies affecting external private investment might
lessen the pressure on the recipient country's balance of payments.
The initial inflow of foreign capital provides foreign exchange, and
this is a benefit. But as noted previously,29 the outward flow of interest,
profits, and dividends may require balance of payments adjustments
that involve some cost. The return flow of capital is a charge on do-
mestic real income that has to be transferred abroad either by increas-
ing exports, decreasing imports, or receiving additional capital from
overseas. To avoid or reduce this cost, local equity participation is fre-
quently required. Many developing countries, under their foreign in-
vestment statutes and screening policies, also exclude foreign invest-
ments that do not contribute to an increase in exports or a replacement
of imports, allowing entry only for investments which it is believed
will ern sufficient foreign exchange to service their own transfers.
Through exchange controls and taxation, the developing country may
also limit the maximum transferable return on foreign capital by re-
stricting the transfer of profits to some percentage of direct investment
capital per annum, or by allowing earnings up to some percentage of
registered foreign capital to be remitted at a lower official exchange
rate and the remainder at only a higher free market rate. More severe
exchange restrictions are generally applied to the repatriation of cap-
ital. A number of countries also attempt to limit transfer of income
abroad by imposing a tax on dividends paid to nonresidents. Thus, by
means of an absolute ceiling on income and capital transfers, unfavor-
able exchange rates, and increased taxation, the host country seeks to
encourage the reinvestment of profits rather than the withdrawal with
consequent pressure on the balance of payments.
On the surface, these measures seem sensible, but when examined
more closely they too are subject to some criticism. A direct investment
29 See pp. 475-76 supra.
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may ease the balance of payments even if it does not occur in an export
or import-replacing industry. What ultimately matters for the balance
of payments is the productivity of investment and the impact of the
investment on the total use of resources; the concern with the direct
stimulation of exports or direct replacement of imports is a policy of
misplaced concreteness. In a fundamental sense, the shortage of foreign
exchange is a reflection of the shortage of domestic output; therefore,
whatever does the most to increase domestic output will also contribute
the most to easing the pressure on the balance of payments. As long as
capital is allocated according to its most productive use and any excess
spending associated with inflation is avoided, the necessary surplus of
foreign exchange to service the foreign capital can be created indi-
rectly. Even in the event that the investment yields an additional out-
put of goods for only the home market, this will still be indirectly
import-reducing-provided it does not involve inflationary financing.
For the sale of the new products on the domestic market will neces-
sarily divert expenditure away from imports. The investment may also
indirectly increase export capacity or foster the production of import
substitutes by freeing resources from other uses for transference to ex-
port or import-competing industries. The decisive point is that the
allocation of foreign capital according to the criterion of highest social
marginal productivity will also be the most favorable fcir debt servic-
ing, since it maximizes the increase in income from a given amount of
capital, thereby contributing to the growth of foreign exchange avail-
abilities.
The concern with the reinvestment of profits may also be short-
sighted. If the initial investment is of value in itself, but the foreign
investor does not wish to reinvest his profits in the country, then at-
tempts to force him to do so are more likely to result simply in a
smaller inflow of foreign investment instead of any additional con-
tribution from the reinvestment of profits. There is then a loss to the
economy equal to the amount by which real national income would
have risen from the investment less the real value of dividend payments
abroad. Those firms that will not be deterred by the reinvestment
requirement will be precisely those that would expect reinvestment to
be profitable anyway, and reinvestment would occur without the gov-
ernmental requirement.
Moreover, while the insistence on reinvestment does reduce the im-
mediate demand for foreign exchange to pay dividends abroad, it si-
multaneously raises the amount of foreign investment on which further
dividends may be earned and transferred in the future-without hay-
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ing the increased investment accompanied by any additional inflow of
foreign exchange. If the intangible benefits-the managerial and tech-
nical assistance-from the original investment are realized within a
short period of time, then the continued expansion of the foreign en-
terprise through retained earnings ceases to make any special contribu-
tion to the economy. But the ploughing-back of profit is tantamount
to new foreign investment which expands the base on which profits
may be made and causes the country's foreign service charges to become
ever greater as the foreign equity increases. It may therefore be sub-
mitted that to restrain the rise in foreign service charges, the develop-
ing country should attempt to have as much of the subsequent expan-
sion as is possible be financed from local equity sources. Alternatively,
instead of encouraging further expansion of the initial investment, the
host country may find it more desirable in the interests of diversifica-
tion of the economy to encourage the investment of profits in other
activities in the economy. To the extent that the initial investment
gives rise to future investment elsewhere in the economy, the benefits
of foreign investment become more widespread.
Out of concern for the balance of payments effect and also the dis-
tribution effect, many countries have attempted to secure local equity
participation from the very beginning of the investment by excluding
the foreign investor in certain industries unless the investment is in
the form of a joint international business venture.30 Ceteris paribus,
an equity joint venture does allow more positive distribution and bal-
ance of payments effects than would 100% foreign ownership, but these
advantages should not be overemphasized. There are also several dis-
advantages which may combine in certain cases to make it undesirable
to encourage or enforce an equity joint venture.
If a foreign investor believed it was advantageous to participate in
a joint venture, he would seek its establishment without the require-
ment of a foreign investment law. To the potential investor, the re-
quirement cannot encourage more foreign investment than would have
been forthcoming without the requirement; it can only operate in the
direction of discouraging foreign investment. A joint venture will not
be attractive to the foreign investor when the foreign enterprise has
adequate capital and does not need local equity capital, there is no
need to have a local partner to supply local knowledge, a branch opera-
30 See JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (Friedmann & Kalmanoff eds. 1961);
Blough, Joint International Business Ventures in Less Developed Countries, in SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD 513-35 (1960).
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tion is desired instead of the establishment of a local company, or when
the participation of a local partner would affect the freedom of opera-
tion of an internationally integrated company. Given the foreign in-
vestor's disinclination to engage in a joint venture, the developing
country's insistence on this form of investment will simply diminish
the inflow of foreign capital.
From the standpoint of benefits to the recipient country, there are
also conditions under which the joint venture cannot be considered as
the preferred form of foreign investment. To require domestic par-
ticipation is, of course, to tie the amount of foreign investment to the
amount of domestic investment that will be forthcoming; even if the
foreign investor were willing to invest in a joint venture, the foreign
investment will be lost if domestic investors do not respond. Assum-
ing there is adequate response, there is still a problem connected with
the means of financing the domestic participation. If, on the one hand,
local savings do exist and are mobilized by local participation in the
foreign investment, the result may simply be to replace domestic in-
vestment which would otherwise have been made; the joint venture
then has an opportunity cost by way of the foregone domestic invest-
ment. If, on the other hand, a significant supply of local savings is not
already existent, but the joint venture presents an attractive opportu-
nity for investment and the local investor borrows the necessary funds,
then the joint venture has simply led to credit creation and inflation-
ary financing of the local equity participation; this, in turn, will induce
imports which are uncovered by an inflow of foreign exchange. The
joint venture might also arise through the acquisition of a preexisting
domestic firm-in this case actual or potential competition will be di-
minished, and an undesirable concentration of economic power may
result. To the extent that joint ventures tend to predominate in large-
scale rather than smaller-scale enterprises, there is also less possibility
for the imitation of the joint venture's production techniques else-
where in the economy; the external economies from a large-scale joint
venture may thereby be less than from a number of smaller-scale for-
eign enterprises which in the aggregate involve no greater amount of
foreign equity than is present in the single large-scale joint venture.
Finally, the true alternative to the joint venture is not complete
foreign ownership but rather no foreign equity participation at all. To
the host country, the advantage of a joint venture is the acquisition of
the intangible benefits and the nonmonetary transfer of resources asso-
ciated with foreign investment without incurring the costs of 100%
foreign equity. But along a scale of different forms of foreign invest-
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ment, the equity joint venture is only one of several alternative ar-
rangements for securing the international transfer of technology and
the acquisition of managerial skills. At one extreme on the scale is
the foreign investment without local participation and without a time
limit on its duration. This may be modified by a requirement that
after the initial foreign investment, any subsequent expansion of the
enterprise must come through local participation, in order to reduce
the proportion of foreign equity over time; or a limited time duration
may be imposed, after which the foreign enterprise must be sold to
local investors. The joint venture extends this principle by limiting
the amount of foreign equity and securing local participation at the
outset. Compared with the alternative of a time limit on foreign in-
vestment and the eventual bringing of the foreign investment under
local ownership and control, the joint venture is clearly less costly, in-
sofar as the equity shares of the foreign enterprise will appreciate, and
the repatriation of the sales proceeds imposes a foreign exchange
burden.
If, however, the foreign know-how, managerial talent, and training
facilities could be acquired without the foreign equity from the start,
the developing country could then completely escape the costs of for-
eign financial involvement. To this end, contractual devices compris-
ing engineering and construction agreements, technical services agree-
ments, management contracts, or license or franchise arrangements may
be superior to the equity joint venture.31 These contractual devices
provide an extremely flexible means for directly transferring special-
ized technical and managerial knowledge of a proprietary nature from
a foreign enterprise which is the outstanding-and the early-benefit
of foreign investment, without the higher costs-which mount over
time-of a foreign equity interest.
Instead of overemphasizing the institution of an equity joint venture,
a developing country may therefore be better advised to seek the fol-
lowing mix: for the securing of foreign exchange-foreign public
sources of capital (the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank,
Export-Import Bank, Development Loan Fund) that can supply funds
31 For an exposition of contractual devices, see generally U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, 29-197.
Considerable scope for technical collaboration agreements is indicated by the fact
that more than 1,700 collaboration agreements were concluded in India during the period
1957-1963. KIDRON, FOREIGN INvEsTMENTS IN IDIA 260 (1965). For discussion of the terms
of collaboration agreements, see id. at 281-85; KusT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN INDIA 150-55
(1964); Postwar Foreign Investment in India, Economic Bull. for Asia and Far East, June
1962, pp. 13-16.
1966]
The University of Chicago Law Review
in the form of long-term, low-interest loans and grants-in-aid; for the
stimulation of the private sector-the relending of these funds to do-
mestic enterprise through intermediate credit institutions such as local
development banks or domestic finance corporations; 32 for technical
knowledge and business methods-more extensive use of contractual
devices with foreign supplying enterprises. Through such a combina-
tion of public foreign capital with a management contract or technical
collaboration agreement, the developing country may obtain both the
capital and the technical, managerial, and training services at a lower
cost than by insisting on an equity joint venture. The higher rate of
return required for a direct equity investment is in essence a payment
for foreign knowledge, and if this can be acquired through contractual
devices while the foreign capital is received from governmental sources
at a low rate of interest, then there is a distinct advantage in shifting
the emphasis to management and service contracts. A greater demand
for this type of activity should create an enlarged supply. If developing
countries are attempting to depart from the traditional pattern of pri-
vate foreign investment, so too is there a compelling need to seek new
methods of foreign partnership to gain the benefits of "jointness" at
reduced cost. The potentialities for thus combining local ownership
with technical assistance from private foreign enterprise and financial
aid from public sources can become of considerable practical impor-
tance.
IV. PROTECTiON OF PRIVATE FoREIGN INVESTMENT
Beyond their immediate effects, the foreign investment laws raise a
number of questions regarding the ultimate problem of providing legal
security for foreign capital. To remove "disincentives" on international
investment there must be protection against the noncommercial risks
of confiscation, currency inconvertibility, and adverse discriminatory
treatment. While the existence of a favorable legal environment has
been demonstrated in the more advanced industrial nations through
historical experience, an equivalent tradition is lacking in the newly
developing countries, and these countries must substitute for this
through assurances and guarantees in their foreign investment statutes.
This is important not only to encourage an inflow of foreign invest-
ment, but also to provide sufficient permanent security so that the for-
eign enterprise will be willing to undertake longer-term policies, such
32 For an elaboration of the role that these institutions can perform in providing
long-term finance to private industry, see generally BosKEY, PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES OF
DEVELOPMENT BANKS (1959); DIAMOND, DEVELOPMENT BANKS (1957); Diamond, Development
Finance Companies, 2 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 97 (1965).
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as the investment in human resources, which will increase the benefits
from the foreign investment.
When granting the foreign investor an instrument of approval or
certificate of registration based on a foreign investment statute, the re-
cipient government includes-along with the obligations of the for-
eign investor-a set of specific guarantees: these are generally guaran-
tees against expropriation within a minimum time period, freedom
from currency controls on the remittance of profits and capital repa-
triation, and promises of exemptions from taxes and import restric-
tions. In essence, a "foreign investment-development agreement" is
reached,33 and the subsequent protection accorded foreign investment
will depend in large part on the specific terms negotiated in this initial
agreement between the private foreign investor and the recipient state.
The adequacy of these guarantees under international law, however,
is problematical. 34
The first problem in considering the international legal protection
accorded by an instrument of approval is to determine whether the
assurances by the recipient state are "contractual" in nature. If the
instrument of approval is directly related to a specific agreement be-
tween the government and the foreign investor, contractual elements
can be readily identified. If, however, the instrument of approval is
simply issued under a general investment incentive program of the
developing country, and these assurances are conveyed merely by way
of a unilateral act on the part of the host government under the in-
centive program, then it becomes much more difficult to establish that
an instrument of approval is "contractual" in nature.
Assuming a contractual obligation can be established, the next prob-
33 The term "economic development agreement" has been substituted for "concession
agreement." See Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, in AcADEMm DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL, I RECUEIL DES Couas 271 (1962); McNair, The General Principles of Law Recog-
nized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRiT. YB. INT'L L. 2 (1957); Olmstead, Economic Develop-
ment Agreements-Part 1I, 49 CAnr. L. REv. 504, 506 (1961).
"Foreign investment-development agreement" is used here as a more general term
covering all foreign investment agreements with developing states.
34 There are, of course, additional difficulties if the foreign investor seeks his remedy
for alleged breach of the instrument of approval in the domestic courts of any country.
If he sues in the courts of the state which has allegedly breached the agreement, it is
unlikely that the court will reach a decision adverse to the state either because of a
plea of sovereign immunity or because of its following the "new" law. Suits in the courts
of another nation state will run into the barrier of sovereign immunity or, if a third
party is the defendant, the barrier of the act of state doctrine. See generally LILLICH,
THE PROTEMTOn OF FOREIGN INVESTIENT 3-113 (1965); ORFElD- & RE, CASES ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 285-311, 544-75 (rev. ed. 1965). The vagaries of these problems are outside
the scope of this article. At point here is whether or not the investor has an international
claim based upon the host state's alleged breach of the instrument of approval.
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lem is to determine whether a breach of the obligation has occurred.
This requires, of course, an ascertainment of what is the proper law of
the instrument-the municipal law of the state party to the contract,
the municipal law of some other state, public international law, or
possibly "the general principles of law of economic civilized nations."
Problems then arise concerning the content of the governing law. As-
suming that the governing law is not itself public international law, we
finally confront the least settled aspects of the problem: in the absence
of a treaty violation or a denial of justice, will a breach by the contract-
ing state constitute a violation of international law? The fundamental
issue is whether a right, initially created and subsisting within local
municipal law, is protected by international law when the contracting
state has itself changed the local law so as to end its obligations to a
private party under the contract.
Some have submitted that:
[W]here a contract between a sovereign and a foreign na-
tional, because of its legal incidence or economic substance,
is impregnated with an international interest, the case for
measuring the government's adherence to the contract against
the standards of international law is compelling. This is so
whether international law is introduced by way of the rules
of state responsibility, or as the law governing the contract,
or as an end product of the application of the general prin-
ciples of law.35
And some have even argued that the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
applies to any agreement between a state and an alien,36 giving the
agreement the status of an international treaty and leading to the con-
clusion that any breach by the state would constitute a violation of
international law.
The more general view, however, is that this is too all-encompassing
a conclusion and that under the present state of the law, the legal con-
sequences of a breach by a state of a contractual undertaking to an
alien cannot be articulated with satisfactory specificity.37 The limits of
35 Wadmond, The Sanctity of Contract Between a Sovereign and a Foreign National,
in ABA, MINERAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAw PROCEEDINGS 177 (1957).
36 See Ray, Law Governing Contracts Between States and-Foreign Nationals, in SOUTH-
WESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD 36-42 (1960); Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 597 (1961);
Schivebel, International Protection of Contractual Arrangements, 53 AM. Soc'Y INT'L LAW
PROC. 266 (1959); Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959).
37 See FATOUROS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 191-209, 243-301; FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING
STRUCrURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170-81 (1964); NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 173-97 (1965); Pugh, Legal Protection of
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state responsibility are ambiguous when the state's position is that of
both sovereign and private contractor. But it may at least be expected
that discriminatory exercise of governmental power in a pronounced
and manifestly unfair way against the alien would appear to be a sig-
nificant, if not controlling, factor in finding a violation of international
law. 38 There is considerable agreement that even though municipal
law was made the proper law of a state contract, an "arbitrary" termi-
nation or alteration of the contract by a change made in the proper
law may-in terms of the contract itself-constitute tortious conduct
that possesses an internationally illegal quality.39 Moreover, there are
indications that general principles of law such as unjust enrichment,
estoppel, and respect for acquired rights may become increasingly ap-
plied to international law cases involving state promises to private
individuals.40
Although case law does not yet provide legal rules of established
validity regarding the legal responsibility of the state if it interferes
with an alien's "contractual rights," the inadequacies under the local
law of the foreign state and international law can be offset to some
extent through protective measures adopted by the capital-exporting
countries. Provisions providing some protection for foreign investment
may be included in bilateral commercial treaties such as those of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. 4' Under an Investment Guar-
anty Program such as that administered by the Agency for International
Development, the foreign investor can also be insured against loss
resulting from currency inconvertibility, expropriation or confiscation,
and damage to physical assets caused by war, revolution, or insurrec-
tion.42 The recently proposed international convention establishing a
International Transactions Against Non-Commercial Risks, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 319-20 (Surrey & Shaw eds. 1963); Carlston, Con-
cession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 260-64 (1958); Jennings, State
Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 156 (1961); Mann, State Contracts
and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572-75 (1960); Sohn & Baxter, Responsibility
of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961).
38 Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investment, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 718-19 (Friedmann & Pugh eds. 1959); McNair, supra note 33.
39 HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 991 (2d Tev. ed. 1945); Jennings, supra note 37, at 163-
66, 181-82.
40 NwOGUGu, op. cit. supra note 37, at 62-63, 177-85; Lalive, The Doctrine of Acquired
Rights, in RIGrrs AND DUTIES OF PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 183-200 (1965); Fatouros, supra
note 38, at 721-24; Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organization on International Law,
50 Am. J. INT'L L. 475, 502-06 (1956); McNair, supra note 53, at 16-18.
41 NWOGUGU, op. cit. supra note 37, at 120-35.
42 75 Stat. 429 (1961), 22 U.S.C. §§ 2181-84 (1964); FATOUROS, op. cit. supra note 3, at
111-17; NWOGUGU, op. cit. supra note 37, at 67-79; WHITMAN, THE UNITED STATES INVEST-
MENT GUARANTY PROGRAM AND PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1959); Clubb & Vance, supra
note 3, at 487-502; Snyder, supra note 2, at 1092-96.
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conciliation and arbitration service under the auspices of the World
Bank (IBRD) also has potential value from the procedural standpoint
in providing institutional facilities for the settlement of investment
disputes.43
More significant to the private investor than the adequacy of the
guarantees under international law, however, is the probability of
breach of the instrument of approval by the host government. Thus,
the very act of the country's screening process under an investment
law may be interpreted as offering more effective protection than pri-
vate foreign capital has hitherto enjoyed in developing countries. For
if the foreign investment regulations now result in an exclusion of
undesired investments, there is at the same time opportunity for ex-
tensive negotiation and greater security for the particular investment
that is admitted with a special instrument of approval. Discrimination
against certain types of foreign investment is exercised at the outset,
but the discouragement is not indiscriminate. The corollary is that
those investments with "approved status" may look forward to "sym-
pathetic consideration"; the probability of breach is lessened when
the host government participates in the initial investment decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The experience of the last two decades has indicated that the most
decisive determinant of the flow of private capital to the underdevel-
oped countries is the policies of those underdeveloped countries to-
ward private foreign investment. After a period of hostility toward
private foreign investment, many underdeveloped countries are now
actively promoting such investment under conditions established by
foreign investment laws. This article has attempted to analyze the
benefits and costs of various policies of the underdeveloped countries
in light of their effects on the underdeveloped country's allocation of
resources, distribution of income, and balance of payments.
If a foreign investment law has any effect, it is to relate public
policy and private action to each other. As long as the host country
remains serious about accelerating its development, the continued
beneficial economic performance of foreign investment (in terms of
our analysis, a high benefit-cost ratio) will be the decisive determinant
of the investment's security. Given the uncertainties surrounding sub-
43 The convention establishing an International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes as an autonomous international institution under the auspices of the World
Bank was approved March 18, 1965, by the Executive Directors of the World Bank and
submitted to the Bank's 10 member nations for their approval. The convention
enters into force after it has been signed and ratified by twenty governments.
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stantive principles of law in this area, the emphasis must be on the
negotiation of terms in specific ad hoc agreements, with the ultimate
source of security residing in the underlying community of interest
between investor and host country. In the context of national develop-
ment objectives, the greatest value of a foreign investment statute
may prove to be its potential for perceiving this community of interest
in explicit terms-first at the initial stage of negotiating a foreign
investment-development agreement, and subsequently in eliciting the
continuing contribution of the foreign investment to the development
goals of the host country. We may therefore conclude that a benefit-
cost analysis and the economic realities of the development process
are now of higher importance for the protection of private foreign
investment than are the legal doctrines that have hitherto dominated
and artificially limited the approach to this problem.
